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New Approaches to Legal Study
Philip Slayton*
Most lawyers - be they practitioners, judges, or just plain
academics - have a fairly clear idea of what it is they must do
when "studying law". Most lawyers, without giving the matter
very much thought, concern themselves with interpreting
statutes according to well-understood principles, analysing cases
using time-honoured notions such as stare decisis, ratio
decidendi, and obita dicta, and occasionally (very occasionally,
with much trepidation and many disclaimers) venturing a policy
suggestion or two. Not many have wanted to do much else, and
few have suggested any virtue in trying anything new.
But the winds of change appear to be upon us. The last
decade or so has seen development of several apparently new
approaches to consideration of the law. It is my purpose in this
essay to examine two of the better-developed streams of
development, in an attempt to fix their value and significance. I
refer to jurimetrics' - a term generally taken to refer to the use
of electronic (computer) retrieval, quantitative methods, and
symbolic logic in the study of law 2 - and to the growing body
of jurisprudential writings by philosophers, primarily moral
philosophers, generally on topics of contemporary political
interest, such as civil disobedience, abortion and euthanasia.3
*B.A. (Hons.) (Man.), B.A., B.C.L., M.A. (Oxon.), Assistant Professor
of Law, McGill University.
1. A word coined by Lee Loevinger; see Loevinger, Jurimetrics - The
Next Step Forward, (1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev. 455.
2. See Hans Baade, Foreword, (1963) 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. at
p. 1.
3. 1 do not mean to underestimate the importance of developments
which time prevents me from considering, such as the political process
approach (see Glendon Schubert, Judicial Policy-Making, (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman, 1965)); impact analysis (see Becker (ed.), The Impact of
Supreme Court Decisions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969));
games theory (see James Marshall, Lawyers, Truth and the Zero-Sum
Game, (1972) 47 Notre Dame Lawyer 919): artificial intelligence (see L.
Thorne McCarty, Interim Report on the TAXMAN Project: An
Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, (unpublished
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These two streams of development are a product, with respect
to jurimetrics, of western preoccupation with science at the end
of the 1950's (when jurimetrics as a field of study gained that
momentum which has carried it through to the present day),
and, with respect to the writings of philosophers on legal
subjects, growing nation-wide concern in the United States
about issues such as civil disobedience associated with the war
in Indo-China.
1. Jurimetrics
In the field of jurimetrics, most time, effort and money has
been spent on development of electronic legal retrieval.'
Development of computerized retrieval of legal materials was
prompted by the exponential increase in the volume of those
materials. A century ago the Harvard Law Library had less than
15,000 volumes; today it has over 1,000,000 and adds about
20,000 yearly.' Growth of this magnitude makes it extremely
difficult to find all or even most of the material relevant to a
given legal problem. The consequences are several and im-
portant. Fewer and fewer legal cases are adequately prepared.
There is a growth in intellectual and geographical insularity,
since lawyers seek to restrict what it is they must consult, and
choose only those materials from the local jurisdiction or only
paper presented at the Workshop in Computer Applications to Legal
Research and Analysis, Stanford Law School, April 28-9, 1972));
interdisciplinary study (see L. Thorne McCarty's seminar Decision
Technology and Law at the Stanford Faculty of Law, 1973); and many
others.
4. My account of electronic legal retrieval is based on extensive
research which I undertook in 1972 on behalf of the Department of
Communications of the Government of Canada. The complete results of
that research are to be found in my report, entitled Electronic Legal
Retrieval: The Impact of Computers on a Profession, to be published in
1973 by the Department of Communications.. My thanks go to the
Department, and particularly to Mr. Kenneth M. Katz and Mr. Richard
Gwyn, for encouraging and sponsoring my investigations. I should like to
acknowledge the important assistance of Mr. Eric Nadler, a student in the
Faculty of Law, McGill University, who acted as my research assistant on
this project.
5. J. Roger Hamilton, Computer-Assisted Legal Research, (1972) 51
Oregon L. Rev. 665, at p. 666.
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those dealing with a narrow point.6 The cost of research
increases to the point where large law firms or government
agencies alone can properly undertake it, prejudicing small firms
that represent weak clients and exacerbating existing social
inequalities.
The first electronic legal retrieval system was devised by
Professor John Horty, at the University of Pittsburgh Health
Law Center, beginning in 1959.' Important systems now
operating in the United States include Ohio Bar Automated
Research (OBAR),8 operated on a commercial basis by Mead
Data Central Inc.; JURIS of the United States Department of
Justice;9 and LITE (Legal Information Through Electronics),
run by the United States Air Force. The two major Canadian
systems are DATUM/SEDOJ (Documentation Automatique de
Textes juridiques de l'Universit6 de Montr6al), and QUIC/LAW
of the Faculty of Law of Queen's University. Lesser systems
devoted to statute retrieval exist.' 0
QUIC/LAW is representative of development in this field.
It was designed to be an "interactive" system, allowing the user
to conduct his own searches in direct communication with the
computer without the intervention of a third party; this allows
the user to obtain constant "feedback", so that he can
reformulate his questions in light of the system's response. The
present'' QUIC/LAW data base consists of 67,000 abstracts of
recent scientific works on pollution, the full text of Supreme
6. See Colin Tapper, World Cooperation in the Mechanization of Legal
Information Retrieval, (1968) 9 Jurimetrics Journal 1, at p. 3.
7. For an account of this project, see John Horty, The "Key Words in
Combination" Approach, (1962) M.U.L.L. 54.
8. See Frank J. Troy, Ohio Bar Automated Research - A Practical
System of Computerized Legal Research, (1969) 10 Jurimetrics
Journal 62.
9. See George S. Kondos, Juris: Remote Terminal Legal Information
Retrieval at the United States Department of Justice, (1971) 4 Law and
Computer Technology 147.
10. For examle, MODUL (Medium Ordinateurs et Droit) of Laval
University. See Jean Goulet, Sylvain Houle, and Jeanne Leclerc-Houde,
Jurimitrie et loi: modul, (1971) 6 R.J.T. 115. A large number of
European computerized legal retrieval systems exist; for a comprehensive
listing, see Computerized Research in Countries Outside North America,
(1972) 12 Jurimetrics Journal 119.
11. The time of writing is December, 1972.
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Court of Canada decisions from 1923 to the present, the full
text of the 1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, the Ontario
Reports 1940-72, the Federal Court Reports, and Federal
Statutory Orders and Regulations (an unofficial consolidation
as of April, 1969). Each word in the data base serves as an index
for the term or concept it represents. Words used in a search
formulation are index "locators;" locator and index words are
"matched," with the "matched" document then being retrieved
in one of several alternative ways. The assumption is that any
document mentioning the key words used in the search
formulation will be relevant since the mere occurrence of the
words should reveal the document's significance.
A search "mesh" can be created by use of Boolean
mandatory conditions. By employing an ampersand the user can
request retrieval of documents in which one word appears
together with another specified word. By employing the "but
not" instruction (represented in QUIC/LAW by a percent sign),
the user can ask for documents in which one (or more) words
appear and in which other specified words do not appear.
QUIC/LAW lacks a positional logic feature at present. Usually
when a searcher specifies that he wishes two words to co-occur
in a document he wants them next or close to each other, since
it is likely that they will then represent a single concept, but
QUIC/LAW will retrieve any document in which both search
terms occur, regardless of their relative positions.
QUIC/LAW has the capability of ranking retrieved
documents in order of their supposed "relevance". Ranking
value is computed during the search by statistical algorithms:
The algorithms used by QUIC/LAW for computing
ranking values are based on the assumption that the
statistical distribution of a term in the data base being
searched and in a given document within the data can
be used as a predictor of the relevance of the
document to the query containing such a term. Thus,
a ranking value is computed as an association factor
between a word and a document; and the final
ranking value for a document is obtained by summing
the values for each word of the query contained in
the document.' 2
12. (1972) Vol. 1, No. 5 QUIC/LAWNewsletter, at p. 10.
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There are eleven ranking algorithms available to QUIC/LAW
users. If the user fails to specify an algorithm (which is generally
the case), QUIC/LAW automatically employs a default
algorithm which heavily increases the weight of documents in
proportion to the number of query terms they contain.1
3
In what sense, if at all, is electronic legal retrieval a "new"
way of approaching law? On the face of it, all that is involved is
doing more quickly and more efficiently what everyone has
done all along. All that computers involved in retrieval seem to
do is find relevant statutes and cases so that the lawyer may
then interpret and apply them in the traditional manner. This
view of electronic retrieval is the orthodox attitude, and yet it is
substantially wrong. A careful examination shows that the
impact of electronic legal retrieval on legal thought can be
substantial. The impact comes from an incompatability between
orthodox legal thought processes and the constraints imposed
by the computer on the user.
The salient general characteristics of electronic legal
retrieval systems are as follows: (1) storage is on a full-text
basis; (2) searching is by means of key words; (3) there is a
Boolean logic capability; (4) there may be a statistical ranking
capability; (5) a thesaurus may be operative; (6) there may be a
positional logic feature; and (7) generally the system is of an
on-line interactive kind. These features may be summarized in
this way: the state of the art in electronic legal retrieval allows
the user (in a hypothetical system) to retrieve in an interactive
fashion the full text of statistically ranked legal documents in
which certain key words or their synonyms appear positionally
related to other key words or their synonyms.
13. DATUM, of the University of Montreal, differs from QUIC/LAW in
at least two respects. First, it is not an interactive system; a user conveys
his request (by phone or mail) to a DATUM "consultant" who interprets
the request to the system and then interprets the system's response for the
user. Second, DATUM has made some attempt to meet the problem of
synonyms. The DATUM solution is based on the Kayton SYNDING
thesaurus - see rving Kayton, Retrieving Case Law by Computer: Fact,
Fiction and Future, (1966) 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, at pp. 31-42. For
details of the DATUM thesaurus, see Ejan MacKaay, La creation d'un
Tbbsaurus bilinque pour DATUM, (1971) 6 R.J.T. 51, and Wallace J.
Schwab, La rbalisation du tbaurus-s et du tbbsaurus-g, (1971) 6
R.J.T. 69.
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Regrettably little research has been undertaken into how
lawyers think. In a recent and in some respects pioneering
article,'" Buchanan and Headrick isolate four stages in a
practising lawyer's thought processes: (1) the lawyer establishes
a goal, finds linkage from facts to rules to legal consequences,
and measures at various stages the compatability of a set of
consequences with the established goal; (2) the facts suggest
some possibly applicable rules, and the rules and the cases using
them suggest the relevance and importance of certain facts; (3)
the lawyer differentiates between different rules that might
apply to the same behaviour and events; (4) if the lawyer
cannot find cases whose facts are similar to the facts with which
he is working, he attempts to find cases with facts that are
analagous to his own.1 5 More is known of how judges reason.' 6
A clear and traditional account has been given by Professor
Rupert Cross.''7 Cross argues that the deductive element in
judicial reasoning is trivial, since the crucial characterization is
done before the reasoning can be cast into syllogistic form. He
notes that little a judge does can properly be described as
inductive, since in law, unlike in science, rules govern cases,
rather than cases generating rules. The key to judicial reasoning,
in Cross' opinion, is reasoning by analogy.
The Buchanan and Headrick analysis demonstrates that the
practising lawyer, confronted with particular facts that pose a
legal problem, seeks, (a) the same or a very similar factual
situation; (b) an analagous factual situation; or (c) a rule which
14. Bruce G. Buchanan and Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation
About Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, (1970) 23 Stanford L.
Rev. 40.
15. Ibid., at pp. 51-52.
16. Some of the better known writings on this subject include
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1921); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948); Richard A.
Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1961); and Louis L. Jaffe, Englisb and American Judges as Lawmakers,
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969). For an interesting Canadian
account, see Paul Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making,
(1970) 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
17. Rupert Cross, Precedent in Englisb Law, (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1968), Ch. VI. Cross's analysis appears to some extent to be based
on that of Levi, supra note 16.
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benefits his client and is prima facie applicable to the case.
Cross's discussion suggests that a judge does one or more of the
following: (a) looks for the same or very similar factual
situations; (b) looks for analogous factual situations; (c)
determines the ratio decidendi of identical, similar or analagous
case; (d) decides whether to apply that ratio on the basis of (i)
how much the previous case resembles the instant case, or, more
likely, (ii) policy considerations. I have observed elsewhere that
"whatever it is that stimulated judicial response, it is the rules
and principles of law that define acceptable limits of that
response. .. 18 What I mean is that although judges may be
motivated by non-legal considerations, they must render
judgment in terms of legal concepts. The consequence is that
judges may well often be looking for a rule which achieves a
particular policy purpose and is prima facie, according to legal
concepts, applicable to the case at hand. If we bear this point in
mind, we see that the way of thinking of the practising lawyer
and the judge (and the corresponding research needs) are in all
essential respects the same.
We need now ask whether electronic legal retrieval,
exhibiting the characteristics I outline above, adequately
represents the thought processes I describe. More specifically,
we must ask whether the research needs of lawyers, correspond-
ing to their thought processes, can (given the constraints of
computer retrieval) be translated into key words positionally
related to other key words. No easy answer can be given to this
question; intensive research into both legal thought processes
and electronic retrieval must be undertaken before any
conclusions of general validity can be drawn. However, I want
to indicate at least one possible conclusion that might result
from detailed study. It is unlikely that a computer system can
retrieve a legal rule which serves a particular purpose. Electronic
retrieval of a legal rule or concept (that is, of a document in
which the rule or concept appears) can only be accomplished if
the user indicates precisely in words, either the nature of that
rule or concept, or the nature of the document in which it will
be found. It is exactly this that he cannot do. In the first place,
ex hypothesi the user does not know what it is that he does not
18. Philip Slayton, A Critical Comment on Scalogram Analysis of
Supreme Court of Canada Cases, (1971) 21 U. of Tor. L.J. 393, at p. 399.
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know. Secondly, a legal concept or rule, unlike a factual
occurrence, cannot adequately be described, and any retrieval
system which imposes this requirement is doomed to failure. It
may be objected that if in this respect electronic systems are no
better than manual systems, at least they are no worse. But I
suggest that manual searching in a library, unlike computer
retrieval, permits random conceptual searching. It is this kind of
search which permits the user rapidly and intuitively to transfer
his attention from one part of the data base to a different part
and which will allow retrieval of a purpose-serving rule; arguably
it is here that creativity in legal research is to be found.
Accordingly, electronic systems may well be worse than the
manual equivalent.
Electronic legal retrieval, willy-nilly, may easily have a
substantial impact on legal thought. To the extent that
computer retrieval replaces manual retrieval, and thereby causes
extinction of random conceptual searching, legal creativity will
diminish. Creativity will be replaced by emphasis on that need
which electronic retrieval can meet - the need to find identical,
similar, or analagous fact situations. The outcome will be that
qualitative judgment will be replaced by increase in data flow.
Use of quantitative methods - a second field of study
falling under the rubric "jurimetrics" - has attracted some
attention in Canada, with two or three scholars attempting to
use these methods in the analysis of decisions by the Supreme
Court.1 9 I have elsewhere analysed these methods and their
application,' and will not repeat here at any length what I
19. See Peck, The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for
Policy through Scalogram 'Analysis, (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666; Peck, A
Bebavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis, (1967)
5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 6; Peck, A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court
of Canada, 1958-1967, in Schubert and Danelski (eds.), Comparative
Judicial Bebaviour, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 293;
Fouts, Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960, in
Comparative Judicial Bebaviour 257; and Russell, The Supreme Court of
Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution, (Ottawa: The Queen's
Printer, 1969).
20. Philip Slayton, A Critical Comment on Scalogram Analysis of
Supreme Court of Canada Cases, (1971) 21 U. of Tor. L.J. 393; Philip
Slayton, Quantitative Methods and Supreme Court Cases, (1972) 10
Osgoode Hall L.J. 429.
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have already said. The scalogram method has been described by
Glendon Schubert, its leading proponent, in the following way:
...the cases which the Court has docketed for
decision-making on the merits of the issues presented
are conceptualized as being equivalent tothe items of
a questionnaire. Each case asks the justices to respond
to the question: is your attitude toward value X
sufficiently favourable that you believe that a claim
of degree Y should be upheld? .. .X defines the
content of the scale variable which is perceived by the
respondents to be the relevant criterion for deciding
the case; Y is the perceived verbal statement which
specifies the location of the stimulus-point on the
scale...
If a judicial respondent accepts the defined
valuation, he is scored as having voted affirmatively;
if he rejects it, he is scored as having voted negatively.
The scale matrix consists of scores for the votes of
the respondents, with each column consisting of the
set of votes of a single justice for all decisions in
which he participated, and each row consisting of
that set of votes for all justices who participated in a
particular decision... In constructing the scale, the
objective is the usual one of maximizing the internal
consistency of the voting patterns for the respond-
ents...21
I suggested in an earlier article 2 2 that although the technique
described by Schubert is apparently innovative, upon examina-
tion the underlying way of thinking about law seems to be the
same as, or at least similar to, that of the legal realists. The
importance of formal reasons for judgment is discounted, with
emphasis being paced on a judge's "vote". Early realists did not
progress much beyond speculating about the motives behind
any given"vote" (rejecting the idea that motives were expressed
in the judgment); modern behaviouralists have erected a
scientific superstructure on the foundations laid by Frank and
21. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind, (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1965), at pp. 75-7.
22. Supra note 20, 21, U. of Tor. L.J., at p. 395.
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others, but this should not obscure the fact that their
techniques do not represent a significant new philosophical
contribution to legal science.
A field of jurimetrics which is less developed but more
interesting is the application of modern logic to legal analysis.
To the extent that most lawyers are aware of and employ the
techniques of "logic," they use the Aristotelian syllogism; very
few know of the possibilities presented by mathematical or
symbolic logic, a science which began in 1847, with publication
by George Boole of The Mathematical Analysis of Logic,2 3 and
gained major momentum at the beginning of this century with
the appearance of the great work, Principia Mathematica. 2 4
Loevinger describes the modern logical viewpoint or frame of
reference as applied to legal analysis (to be distinguished from
ostensible, psychological and empirical viewpoints) in the
following way:
Whereas the ostensible level of analysis accepts the
language of legal opinions at substantially its face
value, the logical analysis inquires into the implica-
tions and significance of the terms and the context
used. In the modern view, logic itself constitutes a
different frame of reference than ordinary language.
Logic, in the modern lexicon is a meta-language. To
put it simply, language is a system of terms that refer
to objects or things, whereas logic is a system of
terms that refer to language; or, as Carnap puts it,
logic is the syntax of language. The necessity for so
regarding it arises from the fact that an inquiry into
the validity of reasoning demands the use of some
tools other than the reasoning itself. Reasoning, of
whatever order, cannot validate itself.
2 I
The questions that can be asked within the logical frame of
reference are, according to Loevinger, the following: "What are
the meanings of the terms and contexts used? What are the
23. George Boole, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, (Oxford:
Blackwells, 1965), (first published in 1847).
24. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Matbe-
matica, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1925) (2nd edition).
25. Lee Loevinger, An Introduction to Legal Logic, (1952) 27 Ind. L.J.
471, at p. 488.
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implications of the principles and conclusions adopted? What is
the form of the reasoning employed? In the circumstances, is
this valid reasoning?"
2 6
One of the few forays into this field is an attempt by Allen
and Caldwell to develop ways of appreciating all possible
meanings in syntactically ambiguous legal language.27 Allen and
Caldwell offer a way of representing alternative interpretations
of syntactically ambiguous statements by, (a) classifying the
various elements comprising the statement, (b) tabulating the
results of this classification, and (c) constructing diagrams from
the tabulation.2 8 Classification involves distinguishing between:
"(i) those elements of a statement that are subsidiary sentences,
(ii) those elements of a statement that are only parts of
sentences, (iii) those elements of a statement that are words
that connect subsidiary sentences to other subsidiary sentences,
and (iv) those elements of a statement that are words that
connect parts of sentences to other parts of sentences."
'29
Tabulation prepares classified elements for diagramming;
diagrams "are intended to furnish a means of expressing each of
the possible syntactic interpretations of the statement un-
ambiguously."
3 0
A simple example, one of many examples discussed by
Allen and Caldwell, may illustrate the purpose and technique of
the method. The statement "He wore a light green suit to the
game" has at least three possible meanings: "Was the suit in
question: (A) light green in colour (but possibly heavy in
weight?) (B) light in weight and green in colour (but possibly
dark green?) (C) light in weight and light green in colour?" ' 3  A
full understanding of these possibilities is gained by considering
these three diagrams, presented by Allen and Caldwell: 3 2
26. Ibid., at p. 489.
27. See Layman E. Allen and Mary Ellen Caldwell, Modern Logic and
Judicial Decision Making: A Sketch of One View, (1963) 28 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 213.
28. Ibid., at p. 237.
29. Ibid. For a detailed description of the exact significance of these
categories, see ibid., at p. 240.
30. Ibid., at p. 241.
31. Ibid., at p. 247.
32. Ibid.




b a f to the
game
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The same methodology can, of course, be applied to much more
complicated statements; Allen and Caldwell apply the tech-
nique, for example, to s. 343 (c) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,3 3 s. 6731 (e) of the Business and Professions
Code of California,3 4 and the following provision in a will
which was in issue in Geyer v. Bookwalter:3 1 "She shall have
good and full right to sell and convey fee simple title thereto,
with such easements as are appurtenant, and not account for
the proceeds thereof."
The value of using modern logic in legal analysis is as yet
uncertain; this is simply because there has been insufficient
experimentation to support general hypotheses, let alone valid
conclusions. However, from work which has been done one can
extract some indication of what future research may sub-
stantiate - namely, that application of modern logic to legal
analysis permits, (1) the drafting of unambiguous legal
documents, (2) full grasp of the possible interpretations of
existing legal language, and (3) greater understanding of the
"core" of legal meaning. The third possibility is of greatest
importance, since full appreciation of legal language and its
relationship to legal concepts might well permit radical new
insights into law.
II. A New Jurisprudence
Until quite recently most jurisprudential inquiry conformed to
a classic model. There has been preoccupation with a
33. S. 403, 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), as amended, 67 Stat. 631 (1953), 21
U.S.C. s. 343 (1958): "A food shall be deemed to be misbranded-... (c) If
it is an imitation of another food, unless its label bears, in type of uniform
size and prominence, the word 'imitation' and, immediately thereafter, the
name of the food imitated." See ibid., at pp. 236-240.
34. "Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit the preparation of plans,
drawings, specifications, estimates or instruments of service for single or
multiple dwellings not more than two stories and basement in height;
garages or other structures appurtenant to such dwellings; farm or ranch
buildings; or any other buildings, except steel frame and concrete
buildings, not over one story in height, where the span between bearing
walls does not exceed twenty-five (25) feet." This was the passage in issue
in People v. Wright 131 C.A. 2d 853, 281 p. 2d 384, 390 (1955); see ibid.,
at pp. 261-165.
35. 193 F. Supp. 57, 59 (W. D. Mo. 1961). See ibid, at pp. 259-60.
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jurisprudential classification according to "theories" of law. The
main "theories" mentioned are always the "natural law theory"
and "positivism," although there is the occasional reference to
"philosophical idealism," "sociological jurisprudence,"
"realism," "behaviouralism," "utilitarianism," and a variety of
other "isms." What is revealed is a legal passion for labelling.
There has, however, been a discernible recent change in the
nature of jurisprudential writings. Emphasis has come to be
placed on particular and actual problems, moral or political,
faced by individual citizens.3 6 This development was given its
modern impetus by the "Wolfenden Report," 3 7 published in
Britain in 1957, which had as one of its recommendations that
homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private
should no longer be a criminal offence. 38 This recommendation
was set in the context of an attitude to law sufficiently
well-defined to be called a "philosophy"; the Report said that
the function of the criminal law "is to preserve public order and
decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or
injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploita-
tion and corruption of others, particularly those who are
specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or
mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, official or
economic dependence." '3 9 The Wolfenden Report's recom-
mendations, together with their philosophic underpinnings,
touched off "a controversy which has maintained the highest
36. 1 do not mean to discount the great importance of some more
"general" philosophical works being produced, such as Joseph Raz, The
Concept of a Legal System, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), and
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971).
37. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitu-
tion, 1957, Cmd. 247.
38. Ibid., para. 62.
39. Ibid., para. 13. Lord Devlin has commented that the Wolfenden
Report has "a particular claim to the respect of those interested in
jurisprudence; it does what law reformers so rarely do; it sets out clearly
and carefully what in relation to its subjects it considers the function of
the law to be." Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in Devlin,
The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) 1, at
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standards of public debate." 4 0 The protagonists have been Lord
Devlin, who argues that society has the right to use law to
enforce a societal judgment on morals,4 1 and H. L. A. Hart,
who adopted (with some modification) John Stuart Mill's
position that power over the members of a community can only
be exercised to prevent harm to others.4 2 This debate, which is
well-known4 3 and much admired,44 has in most jurisprudential
works been catalogued according to the old classification. But
such classification obscures the essential nature of the con-
troversy; Hart and Devlin, together with acolytes and com-
mentators, were only, as it were, incidentally commenting on
the nature of law. Their main purpose was to consider the
attitude the law should adopt towards a particular problem in a
particular state at a particular time. Classification in the old
style not only obscures the nature of the debate; it also proves a
remarkably poor way of describing or indexing it. MacGuigan,
for example, includes Hart's "Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals"4" under "Positivism," 4 6 but reprints Sbaw v.
Director of Public Prosecutions4 7  in his chapter entitled
"Natural Law Thought.
4 8
The discussion arising from the Wolfenden Report is by no
means unique in style and content. Similar controversy has, for
40. Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). In Mitchell's view, the debate
began with Devlin's Maccabaean Lecture (Morals and the Criminal Law).
41. The main argument is to be found in Devlin, supra note 39.
42. Hart's position is to be found in Law, Liberty and Morality,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
43. Commentaries are legion. One of the best is Mitchell, supra note
40. See also Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,
(1966) 75 Yale L.J. 986; A.R. Louch, Sins and Crimes (1968) 43
Philosophy 163; for a Canadian commentary, see Yves Caron, The Legal
Enforcement of Morals and So-Called Hart-Devlin Controversy, (1969) 15
McGill L.J. 9.
44. Mitchell writes that "the two protagonists, Lord Devlin himself and
Professor H. L. A. Hart, have shown a degree of sustained passion and
clarity of argument sufficient to cleanse the term 'academic' from any
taint of triviality or irrelevance." Supra note 40, p. 1.
45. (1958) 71 Harvard L.R. 593.
46. Mark MacGuigan, Jurisprudence: Readings and Cases, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1966), at pp. 193-214.
47. [1961] 2 All E.R. 446.
48. PP. 245-251 (only the judgment of Viscount Simonds is reprinted).
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example, surrounded abortion and euthenasia. The seminal
work on these subjects is Glanville Williams's The Sanctity of
Life and the Criminal Law,49 published in the same year as the
Wolfenden Report. This book was the harbinger of a host of
writing."0 Most recently, the focus of jurisprudential activity
has been the issue of civil disobedience; this development is a
consequence of civil unrest and lawbreaking (particularly
avoidance of the draft) arising in the United States out of that
country's military involvement in Indo-China,"' although it was
foreshadowed by literature of the civil rights movement.5 2
Writing on civil disobedience has proliferated," most of it
49. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957).
50. On abortion, see, for example, John T. Noonan, Jr., The Morality
of Abortion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Daniel
Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, (New York: Macmillan,
1970); Robert M. Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality? (1970) 46
Notre Dame Lawyer 5; Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion,
(1971) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 47; Baruch Brody, Thomson on
Abortion, (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 335; R. J. Gerber,
Abortion: Paramenters for Decision; (1972) 82 Ethics 137; and D. Gerber,
Abortion: The Uptake Argument, (1972) 83 Ethics 80.
On euthanasia, see A. B. Downing (ed.), Euthanasia and the Right to
Death, (London: Peter Owen, 1969), and Jonathan Gould (ed.), Your
Death Warrant? The Implications of Euthanasia, (London: Geoffrey
Chapman, 1971).
51. There is, of course, a great classical literature of civil disobedience.
Consider, for example, Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957) (first published in 1849); the writings of Tolstoy
(see Tolstoy's Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence, (New
York: Signet Books, 1967)); and the writings of Gandhi (see M. K.
Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistence, (New York: Schocken, 1961)).
52. For example, Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait, (New
York: Signet Books, 1964).
53. Among the most interesting recent publications are Hannah
Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in Arendt, Crises of the Republic, (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1969); Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience: Conscience,
Tactics, and the Law, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Leon
Friedman, The Wise Minority: An Argument for Draft Resistance and Civil
Disobedience, (New York: Dial Press, 1971); Robert T. Hall, The Morality
of Civil Disobedience, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Michael
Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1971); essays by Nielsen, Margolis, Caws,
Bedau, Gendin and Schochet, in Virginia Held, Kai Nielsen and Charles
Parsons (eds.), Philosophy and Political Action; (New York: Oxford
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coming from the pens of philosophers. To give some indication
of the style of argument, I shall briefly analyse some key points
made by Professor Carl Cohen in Civil Disobedience: Con-
science, Tactics, and the Law. 5 4
Cohen defines civil disobedience as "an act of protest,
deliberately unlawful, conscientiously and publicly per-
formed."" s He says that "it follows from the nature of an act
of civil disobedience that it cannot be given a legal justifica-
tion."1 6 What the civil disobedient must do is "give extra-legal
reasons for breaking the law, and he must show that these
non-legal considerations override his obligation to obey the
law." 7 Possible extra-legal reasons include appeal to a divine or
natural law whose authority is supreme,5 8 and appeal to the
principles of utilitarianism (the protester argues "that his
particular disobedience... is likely to lead in the long run to a
better or more just society than would his compliance. . ."' ).
Cohen favours the utilitarian justification; of the "higher-law"
approach he says that "there may be difficulties in knowing
what the law of God commands. ..60 Cohen considers seven
possible arguments against civil disobedience. Three of the seven
are particularly compelling. The Third Argument is that "every
attempt to justify civil disobedience must fail, because all such
efforts depend, at some point, upon a fundamental premise that
is false - the premise that every man is entitled to decide for
himself which laws he is to obey."'' 6 To this argument Cohen
replies that it "involves a misconception of the character of the
moral life entirely, giving to the state authority a role in human
life far greater than it deserves."' 62 The Fourth Argument is
University Press, 1971); and essays by Rostow, Wolff, and others, in
Eugene v. Rostow (ed.), Is Law Dead? (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1971). Important earlier essays by Rawls, Konvitz, Brandt, Ladd, Taylor
and others, are to be found in Sydney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy,
(New York: New York University Press, 1964).
54. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
55. Ibid., p. 39.
56. Ibid., p. 94.
57. Ibid., p. 102.
58. Ibid., p. 105.
59. Ibid., p. 120.
60. Ibid., p. 110.
61. Ibid., p. 138.
62. Ibid., p. 141.
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that "an effective system of laws... is possible only when the
authority of those law is not readily overthrown by appeal to
some principles outside the legal system." 6 3 Cohen voices a
number of objections to this argument: the most cogent is
simply that "historical evidence does not support the claim that
appeal to some higher law leads to chaos." 6 4 The Seventh
Argument, perhaps the most convincing, is that the civil
disobedient "applies a form of pressure illegitimate in the
political arena, thereby vitiating (to the extent he is effective)
the principle of majority rule. He creates, in effect, a state of
war between himself and his community, forcing the com-
munity to respond similarly, subverting and rendering in-
applicable the democratic process. .. "65 To this, Cohen weakly
replies that the premise is unsound; it is just not true that
disobedience of some laws subverts the entire system of
government.
The most interesting feature of Cohen's book is the
scattering throughout the text of nineteen descriptions of acts
of civil disobedience (each description is called a "case"). The
"'cases" range from the burning of draft records by the
"Catonsville Nine" 66 to flag-desecration. 6 ' All but four
describe acts protesting American military involvement in
Vietnam. It is clearly these and similar examples of civil
disobedience which are of first concern to Cohen; like Hart and
Devlin, Cohen seeks to illuminate a contemporary political
problem, and only incidentally provides a general exegesis. Yet
the great virtue of Cohen's work is that it is so susceptible to
generalization; he provides by way of example answers to
fundamental jurisprudential questions - "Does a citizen have a
moral obligation to obey the law? Are there any limits to the
extent or force of his obligation? Are there circumstances in
which he is relieved of any duty of obedience?" 6 8 Work such as
that done by Devlin, Hart and Cohen sits mid-way on the
63. Ibid., p. 146.
64. Ibid.,
65. Ibid., p. 168.
66. Case 6, Ibid., p. 54.
67. Case 18, Ibid., p. 185.
68. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarcbism, in Rostow (ed.), Is
Law Dead? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971) p. 110.
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jurisprudential spectrum, anchored in reality, yet intelligently
philosophical, able perhaps to "cleanse the term 'academic'
from any taint of triviality or irrelevance."
'6 9
III. Conclusion
Jurimetrics and jurisprudence are strange bedfellows. Loevinger
has written: "Jurisprudence is primarily an undertaking of
rationalism; jurimetrics is an effort to utilize the methods of
science in the field of law. The conclusions of jurisprudence are
merely debatable; the conclusions of jurimetrics are testable.
Jurisprudence cogitates essence and ends and values. Jurimetrics
investigates methods of inquiry. '"70 Despite the differences, it
makes sense to discuss jurimetrics and jurisprudence together at
this stage in the evolution of legal study. Each offers
opportunities to consider law from a new and fruitful
perspective, although in some instances, as I have attempted to
indicate, those opportunities can be exaggerated, and modesty
and caution must be the watchwords.
Is what is apparently innovative really new? In sum,
jurimetrics should cause little concern to the average lawyer.
Computerized retrieval may go some way towards solving some
of the practical problems of legal research, but the cure may be
worse then the disease. Quantitative methods, although attrac-
tive and useful in some respects, seem merely to be a technique
reflecting a well-established and long-understood view of the
legal process. Finally, use of modern logic in legal analysis,
although promising much, remains too undeveloped to warrant
serious attention by any but the dedicated researcher.
What I have termed "a new jurisprudence" is of greater
importance. Application of philosophical methods to "public
affairs" produces the prospect of increasing both the lawyer's
understanding of his art and the community's respect for the
law. It is time, if not to re-think the old categories, at least to
bring them to the service of our restless age. Law has always
been among the most conservative professions. But mindless
conservatism must be abandoned, and opportunities seized
before they slip away.
69. Supra note 44.
70. Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry,
(1963) 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, p. 8.
